NIGERIA 1977 B
THE CHURCH AND ISLAM IN NIGERIA

November 1977

Muslim-Christian relations in Nigeria have always been a delicate matter. The most positive relationships are the personal contacts on a secular level between Muslims and Christians who live or work together. Yet the secular fields of employment, trade etc. are also scenes of frequent discrimination on the basis of religion. Official contacts between Muslim and Christian religious leaders have been minimal, and suspicion dominates the atmosphere.

On the Christian side the most important need, which will need attention for a long time to come, is the formation of the Christian people with a right understanding of Islam. Christians should be educated to give credit to what Islam has in common with Christianity, to give credit to the way Muslims live out certain religious values in an outstanding way, and at the same time to distinguish carefully how Christianity differs from Islam and goes beyond it, having at hand at all times an adequate answer to explain the special hope we have because the Word became one of us and gave us his Spirit (cf. 1 Pet 3:15).

A less important need, yet very urgent at the present moment, is to face the issue of the provisions for Islamic interests in the national Constitution, particularly the question of Sharî`a courts. This question could be approached form the point of view of giving preferential treatment to one religion or of imposing liabilities on another, but an underlying issue needs to be answered first. That is the question of whether or to what extent is or should Nigeria be a secular state.

An excellent discussion of the issue of secularism is the article by Dr. Ahmed Beita Yusuf, "The right to freedom from discrimination" (New Nigerian, 23 September 1977). This article should be studied in its entirety, but its main points can be summarized as follows: The Constitution must recognize the existence of different social segments and guarantee equal treatment to them so as to assure their fundamental rights. Included in these rights are freedom of worship and freedom to provide religious education for the young, as stated in Section 31. Yet Section 35, subsections (4) and (5) contradict Section 31 and limit freedom of religious education. To cut off public funds for religious instruction now would be giving preferential treatment to secularism and atheism. Even in the U.S., the "wall between church and state" allows considerable indirect support to religion. Many cases point to the conclusion that, in contradiction to the secular stand of Section 17, the Nigerian government in one for mor another does and must entangle itself with religious matters. In its proper business of guaranteeing its citizens freedom of worship, the government must provide support which in fact advances the teachings and observances of different religious groups. Dr. Yusuf does not show how equality to the different groups can be concretely assured, but his main argument points to the conclusion that, rather than being a secular state, Nigeria is a pluralistic confessional state, with two partly established religions and due provision for those who follow neither religion.

The next question is whether the provisions for Islamic interests in the Constitution are discriminatory. Two Muslims, Yusufu Bala Usman (New Nigerian, 29 March 1977) and A.B. Ahmed (New Nigerian, 15 September 1977), oppose establishing a Federal Sharî`a court of appeal on grounds that it would be giving a special preferential position to Islam, placing it above other religions in the country. Most Christian commentators argue the same way. A few moderate Muslims, such as the Etsu Nupe Umaru Sanda Ndayako (New Nigerian, 1 August 1977), argue to the contrary, saying that the Sharî`a courts simply provide for the needs of the Muslim community and do not place Islam in a privileged position. He adds that Nigeria, as a secular state, should respect the needs of all groups and care should be taken that Muslims do not infringe on the rights of non-Muslims.

This position of the Etsu Nupe may be ultimately reconcilable with the stand of Christian spokesmen. But very disturbing is the demand of the majority of Muslim commentators and leaders for the establishment of the Sharî`a in toto. This was also the position taken by the National Seminar on Islam and the Draft Constitution at the beginning of August and the National Conference on Freedom of the Press and the Sharî`a in Minna at the end of August (cf. New Nigerian, 7 April, 15, 22 July, 2, 3, 5, 6, 30 August, 13, 28 September) The strategy of these Muslims amy be to bargain for more than they hope for in order to be sure of getting what is provided in the Draft Constitution. But strategy or not, the demand for Sharî`a in toto is alarming Christians and making them more defensive. This extreme, but officially endorsed Muslim position is that a Muslim is subject to no other law than the Sharî`a; the Constitution is valid only in so far as it reflects the Sharî`a, while any other law (imported English law, based on pagan Roman law) is alien and has no binding force for a Muslim. This is true even if there is only one Muslim in the country, but while the 1963 census says Muslims are 45%, the National Seminar on Islamic Law says they are 75% (New Nigerian, 12 April 1977). Other claims go as high as 85% or 90%. Accordingly at the Minna seminar Malam M'aji Shani suggested that the Sharî`a should be made the law of the land, and Sheikh Ahmed Lemu suggested that the Constitution should make Islam the state religion, with the Sharî`a applied in toto to any citizen who believes in God and the Qur'ân (New Nigerian, 30 August 1977).

While demanding the enforcement of the total Sharî`a in personal, civil and criminal law as a matter of religious freedom and inalienable Muslim right, Muslim commentators also say that Christians should not be worried because the Sharî`a applies only to Muslims. We should not be blind to the fact that the Sharî`a touches on the rights of non-Muslims to a considerable extent and imposes many liabilities on them. The Qur'ân 9:5 gives idolaters (followers of traditional religions) the choice of death or conversion to Islam; in 9:29 Scripturary people (Jews and Christians) are given the choice of death or submission to Muslim supremacy with the payment of a special tribute. Other classical documents which elaborate the Sharî`a law on the treatment of subject Christians are the Risâla of Ibn-abî-Zayd al-Qayrawânî and Sirâj al-mulûk by at-Turtûshî. While these documents assure Christians certain elementary rights, the Risâla forbids even greeting a Christian. If a man becomes a Muslim his non-Muslim children may not inherit from him, and a Muslim son is forbidden to bury his non-Muslim father. A Muslim woman may not marry a Christian man, and if any Muslim man or woman becomes a Christian that Christian must be put to death. (Such a law was being enacted in Egypt this year.) At-Turtûshî reproduces the so-called Covenant of `Umar which forbids building new churches or restoring old ones in Muslim towns, forbids displaying the Christian religion or inviting anyone to join it, forbids dressing like Muslims or selling alcoholic drinks, forbids public processions or burial near Muslims etc. At-Turtûshî goes on to quote adîths forbidding employing Jews or Christians when Muslims are available. For example, `Umar objected to his finance minister's hiring a Christian as a secretary and quoted the Qur'ân (5:51): "Do not take Jews or Christians as your allies. They are allies of one another, and anyone who allies himself to them has become one of them." `Umar added: "They are the enemies of God and are treacherous to us. Put them in the place where God has put them." When Muammad ibn-al-Muntashir complained to `Umar ibn-`Abdal`azîz that his Muslim foremen were not trustworthy `Umar replied: "If there is no goodness among the People of the Qur'ân it is more certain that there is no goodness among the others." Non-Muslims are also ineligible to join the army in an Islamic state. Churches may not be higher than the buildings of the Muslims, and churches built after the coming of Islam should be destroyed. The exterior of a church should not attract attention; if a cross is displayed outside the church it should be broken over the head of the proprietor.

It may be true that historically Muslim rulers have been more tolerant of non-Muslims in their midst than European Christian rulers of non-Christians in their midst, but we are not talking about history but about the establishment of a Constitution with equal rights for everyone. If freedom of religion for Muslims means the adoption of the Sharî`a in toto, and the Sharî`a in toto includes the above-mentioned provisions concerning Christians, Nigerian Christians have no other choice but to demand Constitutional restriction of such exaggerated freedom. Certainly no religion in the name of freedom can be allowed to impose such discriminatory measures on members of another religion. If Muslims themselves would declare clear limits to what they are seeking in the Constitution they might get the sympathy of Christians. But the advocates of Sharî`a in toto make us think that any extension of official recognition of Islam at this time is only one step in a long-term strategy to establish Islamic supremacy and make all non-Muslims second-class citizens.

Some possible practical suggestions:

1. For the present restrict Sharî`a courts to where they already exist on the state level.
2. Restrict the jurisdiction of Sharî`a courts to personal or civil law, invalidating discriminatory consequences on Christian parties.
3. Whatever official representation is given to Islam at the Federal level should also be granted to other religions.