SHARÎ`A AND ISLAMIC REVIVAL IN NIGERIA ⁽¹⁾

Sharî`a in Nigeria

In the pre-colonial period ⁽²⁾

Sharî`a is as old as Islam in Nigeria. Islam followed the trade routes of the medieval empires: Kanem/Borno in the east, Mali and later Songhay in the west. Hausaland was a backwaters or transit land between these powers until the fall of Songhay in 1592. At that time the Hausa states came into prominence and entered into direct trade relations with North Africa. The first-mentioned medieval empire, Kanem-Borno, had its origins in modern Chad. In the 13th century there was in Cairo a hostel for its students of Islam. Around the late 14th century the Kanem rulers moved to Borno in Nigeria ⁽³⁾ The Mais (kings of Borno) professed Islam, but only during the reign of Mai Idris Aloma (1571-1603) did the majority of the leading men of the empire become Muslim. ⁽⁴⁾ The Mais had to tolerate a good deal of traditional religious practice in their domains and to a certain extent even in their courts.

Kano and Katsina were two Hausa states which were on the trade routes between Kanem and the west, and came under the influence of Muslim traders who passed through or settled there. The Kano Chronicle mentions the coming of Wangara (Malian) dâ`îs (missionaries) at the time of King Yaji around 1380, who brought books of Law and Tradition. <sup>(5)</sup> Some Fulani dâ`îs came during the reign of Yakubu, around 1460, bringing books on theology and etymology. ⁽⁶⁾ At this time Islam seems to have struck firm roots as the religion of the kings, even though the majority of their subjects were non-Muslim.

Islam in Hausaland received a strong boost from the Algerian al-Maghîlî (d. 1504), who had to flee his homeland because of his strong convictions. The adoption of Islam by the kings of Katsina seems to date from his visit in 1493. He wrote a book of advice on how to rule for King Rumfa of Kano. ⁽⁷⁾

In spite of the long time they had been Muslims, up to the beginning of the 19th century the kings were expected to be the religious fathers or patrons of all their people, Muslims and non-Muslims. In the terminology of H. Fisher, they were "mixers". ⁽⁸⁾ That is, they observed the rituals of both Islam and the traditional religion, as the occasion demanded.

Against this background `Uthmân ²an Fodiye inaugurated his jihâd in 1804. He was not aiming so much at the conversion of pagans as at the reform of lax Muslims. <sup>(9)</sup> He challenged the Hausa kings to accept his proposals for living strictly according to the Sharî`a, and when they refused he overthrew them, setting up the Sokoto caliphate, a federation of emirates covering most of what is now the north of Nigeria.

`Uthmân ²an Fodiye's thought went very explicitly along the lines of restoring Islam to its pure primitive state. His ideology is set forth in many documents; some of the chief ones are Wathîqa ilâ jâmi` ahl as-Sudân wa-ilâ man shâ' Allâh min al-ikhwân fî l-buldân ⁽¹⁰⁾ and the monumental Bayân wujûb al-hijra wa-taŒrîm muwâlât al-kufra wa-wujûb muwâlât mu'minî l-umma. ⁽¹¹⁾

For the rest of the 19th century the custodians of the Sokoto empire attempted to maintain the supremacy of Sharî`a in their domains, but with limited success. ⁽¹²⁾

The social foundation of the Sokoto jihâd

`Uthmân ²an Fodiye's jihâd aimed at the formation of an Islamic state based on Sharî`a. In so doing, he was restoring an institution that had disappeared in West Africa (if we consider Borno Central Africa) with the fall of the Songhay empire in 1592. Islamic state structures may have folded up at that time, but Islamic society continued, under the form of jamâ`as. <sup>(13)</sup> These were basic Islamic communities, usually led by Àûfî leaders, and assured religious practice, education, economic self-sufficiency, political organization and defence. Sometimes they were located in towns; sometimes, as in the case of `Uthmân's Fulani jamâ`a, they were semi-nomadic. These jamâ`as assured the survival of Islam in a politically fragmented and often disturbed region. As micro-states, all they needed were the right conditions to rise with other jamâ`as and form an Islamic state.

Once an Islamic state is formed, it never lives up to its ideal, and religiously-minded people maintain their loyalty to their local jamâ`a leaders, who were not all Àûfîs, as will be seen below. That was true throughout the 19th century, the colonial period, and now in the independent period of Nigeria.

Sharî`a in the colonial period and the First Republic

The British completed the imposition of their authority over the northernmost parts of Nigeria in 1902. Muslim rulers accepted it under the principle of "necessity". The Boer war in South Africa and the Ashantee war in Ghana left only the meagerest force for Nigeria; this alone, apart from other considerations, was enough reason for the British to adopt a policy of indirect rule, the preservation of all existing institutions under the headship of emirs invested by the British High Commissioner. ⁽¹⁴⁾

The British did not directly recognize Sharî`a as the law for the emirates they conquered, but "native law and custom", to cover the traditional norms in force in the Muslim and pagan areas that comprised Northern Nigeria. Lugard promised the emirs that the British government would not in any way interfere with their "religion". The emirs, in their turn, naturally and usually successfully tried to press this promise to the furthest possible limits so as to include all the ramifications of Islamic Law. Lugard, in fact, did recognize that "the fundamental law in the Native Muslim Courts of Nigeria is the Mâlikî Code of Muhammadan Law". <sup>(15)</sup> This Sharî`a law extended to all matters, even crime and capital offenses, except for penalties such as mutilation, lapidation and crucifixion. ⁽¹⁶⁾

During the period of British rule Islamic law was applied in Northern Nigeria more widely than in any other part of the British Empire, except the Aden Protectorate. ⁽¹⁷⁾ Nevertheless, the fact that the British officially recognized this law only under the title of "native law and custom" permitted some flexibility in the application of the law, according to the views of the emir or "alkali" (al-qâ²î) concerned. In fact, while the British curbed Sharî`a mainly in the area of criminal law, local custom modified it in most other matters, such as land, testimony, marriage and divorce. ⁽¹⁸⁾

The first major challenge to the status of Sharî`a came in 1947 when the appeal trial of the Tsofo Gubba case prevented the imposition of a death penalty for homicide as provided by Sharî`a but disallowed by the British Criminal Code. ⁽¹⁹⁾ This decision was given legislative support by the 1956 Native Courts Law, which stated that "a native court [which included Sharî`a courts] shall not impose a punishment in excess of the maximum punishment permitted by the Criminal Code or such other enactment". <sup>(20)</sup> The status of Sharî`a was confused by further court decisions, leading the British to review the entire situation.

The British were convinced that, as in most other parts of the Muslim world, a separation should be made between Sharî`a courts, which would deal with personal status and family law, and civil courts which would deal with criminal law according to a single code applicable to all Nigerians. ⁽²¹⁾ In 1956 a Native Courts Bill was passed which made a distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims and provided procedures for cases involving both categories. In 1957 the Northern Muslim Court of Appeal was established and in 1958 the Northern Nigerian Government appointed a panel of jurists to make recommendations. The panel, composed of the Chief Justice of Sudan, MuŒammad Abdul Rannat (Chairman), Professor J.N.D. Anderson and Mr. Justice MuŒammad, a judge of the Pakistan Supreme Court, studied how English and Islamic law were accommodated in India and Sudan. The panel made 32 recommendations, "some of which involved changes of the most radical nature for which, as many assured us, public opinion in Northern Nigeria seemed by no means prepared". ⁽²²⁾ Yet the Regional Government accepted all but one of the proposals and passed them into law.

After three years the experiment was to be reviewed, and the panel was reconvened in May 1962. Subsequently, the government published a White Paper which praised the success of the reform. The strongest opposition had been feared against the new Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code which replace the Mâlikî law which had been entrenched for generations in the emirates. Instead, except in "one emirate", the new codes found overwhelming popular approval and esteem. ⁽²³⁾ The provincial magistrate courts set up in 1958 proved successful and were now to be extended to each of the major towns.

The 1962 panel had one misgiving about the development of Sharî`a courts: The Sharî`a Court of Appeal could apply Islamic law to any litigation in which the two parties requested in writing that their dispute should be so decided by the court of first instance. It seemed wrong in principle that the law which should be applied to a particular case should be liable to variation at the behest of the individual litigants rather than determined by legislation. Accordingly the panel recommended that the jurisdiction of the Sharî`a Court of Appeal be confined to cases of personal status and family law. ⁽²⁴⁾ With this compromise the Muslims agreed to abide by the new Constitution for the time being, with the intention of reviving the issue in the future. Until the 1979 constitution the state of affairs was as follows:

In each of the six Northern States there is a Sharia Court of Appeal established under the Sharia Court of Appeal Law. This court is presided over by the Grand Kadi as its President and he is assisted by one or more judges. It only has appellate jurisdiction in all matters of Islamic personal law decided by Upper Area Courts, and also in other matters in which both parties have elected that their rights be determined in accordance with principles of Islamic Law..

It is the final court of appeal in all matters except that in appeals involving fundamental human rights and interpretation of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria there is a further right of appeal to the Supreme Court of Nigeria. ⁽²⁵⁾

Sharî`a in the Second Republic and after

As the military, who ruled Nigeria form 1966, were preparing to hand over to a civilian regime, they appointed a drafting committee for a new constitution. In the draft, which came out in 1976, Sharî`a courts of appeal at the state level were retained, whose jurisdiction extended to "any matter in which the parties have agreed that Islamic Law shall apply" (n. 186.2). In addition there was to be a Federal Sharî`a court of Appeal headed by a Grand Mufti to handle Islamic Personal law and, at the request of the parties, "any other question" (n. 184.3e).

This extension of Sharî`a courts to the federal level stirred up a hornet's nest. Lawyers objected because it amounted to the recognition of two complete and separate legal systems for the country. "Are there any prospects that those who belong to other religions, such as animists, Sango worshippers or adherents of the Ifa oracle would be provided with court systems which take into account their peculiar religious beliefs?" ⁽²⁶⁾

Christian spokesmen saw the action as one further step in a plan to turn the country into an Islamic state. A few Muslims, such as the socialist Yusufu Bala Usman ⁽²⁷⁾ and A.B. Ahmad ⁽²⁸⁾ argued against establishing a Federal Sharî`a court on grounds that it would be giving a preferential position to Islam. On the other side, the Etsu Nupe, Umaru Sanda Ndayako maintained that the Sharî`a courts simply provide for the needs of the Muslim community and do not place Islam in a privileged position. He added that Nigeria, as a secular state, should respect the needs of all groups and care should be taken that Muslims do not infringe on the rights of non-Muslims. ⁽²⁹⁾

A more official Muslim view was expressed at the National Seminar on Islam and the Draft constitution at the beginning of August 1977, and the National Conference on Freedom of the Press and the Sharî`a at Minna at the end of the same month. <sup>(30)</sup> At these meetings demand was made for Sharî`a in toto, not just for religious matters (a "truncated Sharî`a"), but all matters of life. A Constitution is valid only in so far as it reflects the Sharî`a, while any other law (imported English law, based on pagan Roman law) is alien and has no binding force for a Muslim. This is true even for a Muslim minority but, while the 1963 census says that Muslims are 45%, the National Seminar on Islamic Law said they are 75%. ⁽³¹⁾ Accordingly at the Minna seminar Malam Ma'aji Shani suggested that the Constitution should make Islam the state religion, with the Sharî`a applied in toto to any citizen who believes in God and the Qur'ân. ⁽³²⁾

Whether a call was made for an Islamic state or not, the basic argument of any Muslim public statement was that the Constitution should fulfil the wishes and aspiration of the entire population. Nigeria never has been a secular state in the sense that the government makes no provisions for the religious needs of the people. ⁽³³⁾ Accordingly the Muslims pleaded that they were only asking for freedom to follow Islamic law themselves, and that this would in no way affect non-Muslims. The discriminatory provisions against non-Muslims in classical treatises on Islamic statecraft, such as Mâwardî and Ãur³ûshî, were passed over in silence, even while these very provisions are notoriously practised in some of the northern parts of the country. In his book, The classical caliphate (Lagos, 1976), M.O.A. Abdul uses Mâwardî and quotes (without disapproval) the main discriminatory provisions, but considerably tones down Mâwardî's contemptuous language. Non-Muslims under Shari`ah (1979) by Prof. A.R.I. Doi of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, on the other hand, is silent about the worst features of Sharî`a affecting Christians. Doi's attempt to show how sweet and rosy it would be for Christians to live under Islamic law is no doubt sincere, but can only be taken as an exercise in wishful thinking.

When the Constitutive Assembly came to vote on the Sharî`a question in April 1978 the proposal for a Sharî`a court at the federal level was defeated. The states, however, were allowed to provide for Sharî`a courts as they saw fit, still with jurisdiction over personal matters and, where the parties request, "any other question". <sup>(34)</sup> Most Muslim members walked out and boycotted the Assembly for a time. A compromise was then worked out providing for a chamber in the Federal Court of Appeal to hear appeals form state Sharî`a Courts of Appeal. ⁽³⁵⁾ With this compromise the Muslims agreed to abide by the new Constitution for the time being, with the intention of reviving the issue in the future.

The politicians of the Second Republic generally steered clear of the Sharî`a controversy and studiously tried to avoid any religious confrontation or polarization. The authorities firmly curbed any demonstrations against non-Muslims, such as by the Muslim Students Society at Ahmadu Bello University in 1979. Government policy may have been influenced by fear of worse intra-Muslim dissension, such as between the Ãarîqas (Àûfic societies) and the Maitatsine movement (an heir to turn-of-the-century Mahdism with a Khârijite-like fanaticism) which broke into frenzic riots in Kano in December 1980, Maiduguri in October 1982 and Yola in February 1984.

While externally there was peace between Muslims and Christians, one could see a steady movement towards Muslim ascendency and manoeuvring towards Sharî`a rule. Examples of this are the banning of alcohol from Sokoto, President Shagari's announcement of the establishment of a presidential advisory board on Islamic affairs, and the appeal to Muslims in Sokoto and Oyo states to vote for N.P.N., which forced the U.P.N. to come out with better promises in support of Muslim interests.

The coup of 1 January 1984 toppled the plans of the civilians for the time being. Yet the military government under Buhari, even while concentrating on exposing those who robbed the nation's wealth, was Islamic in its general sympathy, and was accused of being the military arm of the ousted N.P.N. government. That is because it was so lenient in handling the representatives the Second Republic. This contrasted with the wishes of the radical junior officers who, it was rumoured, were planning a thorough and bloody sweep of the board but were preempted by the successful coup of the senior officers on 25 August 1985.

The latter coup brought Ibrahim Babangida to power. His many demonstrations of commitment to a secular government for Nigeria's pluralistic society have not pleased the radical Muslim wing. Babangida's ill-calculated secret carrying of the nation into the O.I.C. pleased most Muslims, but raised a storm among Christians which has lasted for years. This and the Sharî`a debate we will turn to in a second paper. First we must survey the different trends of thought and attitude among Muslims in Nigeria.

Differences among Muslims in Nigeria

There are hundred of Muslim associations and societies (jamâ`as) in Nigeria. I will briefly review only the major ones, which have bearing on the political situation and Muslim-Christian relations.

The Àûfî orders

Àûfî orders have been very influential in West Africa, and Nigeria in particular, for centuries. In recent times their influence has been challenged by purist, Wahhâbî movements, but they have strong roots and do not seem about to disappear. That is not only because the orders serve to welcome and integrate Muslim migrants to cities far from their homes, but also because they minister to the spiritual condition of the people as they are. That is, they offer amulets and other religious remedies against evil spirits, enemies, sickness, and obstacles to success in life. ⁽³⁶⁾ This service is in high demand among Nigerians, both Muslims and Christians, especially in times of national economic and political crisis, and explains the popularity of mushroom churches and healing prophets. There are even Muslim preachers who imitate Christian revival services, with dancing, singing, testimonies and advertisements that people should come and get their miracle. ⁽³⁷⁾

In Nigeria the Qâdiriyya is the oldest order. `Uthmân ²an Fodiye belonged to it, and left it as a legacy for centered in Sokoto. Elsewhere the Tijâniyya is stronger, and the two orders have been rivals. ⁽³⁸⁾ The Tijâniyya order, moreover, is divided into the traditional one and the reformed branch. ⁽³⁹⁾

The Izâla

The principal challenge to all the Àûfî brotherhoods is the Jamâ`at izâlat al-bid`a wa-iqâmat as-sunna, known quite simply as the Izala. ⁽⁴⁰⁾ Its patron is Abubakar Gummi, one-time Grand Qâdî of the Northern Region, and now the symbol and leader of extreme and anti-Christian Islam. This movement has gained many adherents, especially among youth who have nothing to lose. There have been many violent episodes between Izala members and other Muslims throughout northern Nigeria for many years. Only recently has this violence been redirected towards Christians.

The Maitatsine movement

The Maitatsine movement was influential in the 1960s and 1970s until its brutal suppression in the early 1980s. Founded by Muhammad of Marwa, Cameroon, known as Maitatsine, it took root in Kano, appealing to the unemployed, but also, because of Maitatsine's reputation for spiritual power, attracted secret support from some influential people.

Muslim writers at the time of the riots condemned the Maitatsine sect as unIslamic because of a variety of allegations. It is significant, however, that no representative of the sect has ever been interviewed to speak their own point of view.

The first Maitatsine riot erupted in Kano in December 1980 when the governor told the group to relocate. Maitatsine's 10,000 followers were defeated by the army and he himself was killed, but his followers regrouped and rioted again in Kaduna in 1982. In February 1984 they struck again at Jimeta, outside Yola. On 26 April 1985 another outbreak occurred at Gombe in Bauchi State, in which 100 were killed. Since then the movement has been underground. ⁽⁴¹⁾

The Nigerian Muslim Brothers ("Shî`ites")

Led by Ibrahim Zakzaky of Zaria, under the inspiration of the Iranian Ayatollah, and Sayyid Qutb and ¥asan al-Bannâ of Egypt, the Nigerian Muslim Brothers reject the Nigerian constitution, flag and legal institutions, accepting only Sharî`a. They vandalized the government Daily Times office in Katsina and attacked the Emir as well on 29 March 1991 because of an article that appeared to insult MuŒammad. In spite of warnings from the governor, they rioted again on 19 April, burning even the Central Mosque.

Commonly known as "Shî`ites", they are quite numerous in the north and frequently conduct demonstrations. Yet it is questionable if they are really Shî`ite in principle; it may be they only admire the bravery and methods of the Ayatollah. Since the death of Abubakar Gummi, the Shî`ites have captured the radical following that the Izala once commanded.

The Muslim Students Society

The Muslim Students Society was founded in Lagos in 1954 by Babs Fafunwa (presently Federal Minister of Education). It grew into a national organization and is affiliated with the World Assembly of Muslim Youth which was founded in 1972 under the auspices of the OIC. The movement has become radicalized and rejects the Nigerian Constitution and anything secular. Chafing over the visit of the Pope to Kaduna in February 1982, when a million Christians gathered to see him, and the later visit of Archbishop Runcie to Kano, they organized the Kano riot of November 1982. [See the next paper.]

The Jama`atu Naªril Islam

The Jama`atu Nasril Islam was founded in January 1962 by Ahmadu Bello, the late Sardauna of Sokoto and Premier of the Northern Region. Its aim was to coordinate Muslim efforts in Nigeria and become the spokesman of all Muslims in the country. During the lifetime of Ahmadu Bello (until January 1966) it was very active in publishing literature, building mosques and organizing conversion campaigns. Then it lost its momentum, and other societies, particularly among the Yorubas, asserted their independence from this organization whose president is by statute the Sultan of Sokoto. The conflict between the Àûfî brotherhoods and the Izala also came out at JNI meetings and was another cause of its loss of influence.

Since around 1988 the JNI has shown new signs of life, and has initiated many projects and activities.

The Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs

Because the JNI could no longer speak for all Muslims in Nigeria, the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs was founded in Kaduna in 1973 on the basis of four representatives from every state, but with the Sultan of Sokoto as the automatic president. It aimed "to cater for the interest of Islam throughout the Federation, to serve as a channel of contact with the government of Nigeria on Islamic affairs, where necessary, and to serve as the only channel of contact on Islamic matters".

The political influence of this body is tremendous. It has been very vocal on the questions of Sharî`a, the OIC, and the communal violence between Muslims and Christians. ⁽⁴²⁾

State Islam

State Islam is not an organized movement like the others, but is a phenomenon similar to what we see elsewhere in the Muslim world. State Islam in Nigeria arose during the colonial period. Along with the system of indirect rule through emirs and chiefs, the British instituted regional and provincial governments parallel and superior to that of the "native authority". In the end the emirs were to lose all authority but the appearances. In the first twenty years of independence, the emirs were deprived of control of the police, courts, prisons and taxes, and were left with only ceremonial functions. ⁽⁴³⁾

Real power passed to an amorphous conglomeration of business, political and tribal interests, sometimes competing with one another and sometimes in coalition. Some power holders are high-profile holders of political office; others operate behind the scenes. All of these are motivated by getting their share of the national cake. They are secularists at heart, and use Islam only as a veneer.

Very few Muslim rulers enjoy moral respect. One such was the former Sultan of Sokoto, Abubakar. Over 50 years on the throne, he died in 1988(?). The political authority of the Sultan is now virtually nil, but the office is one of great prestige and influence. One of his sons was announced on the radio as successor, but the government canceled that and appointed Ibrahim Dassuki, a very wealthy business man who had held many high government posts as well. The people of Sokoto rioted, chanting "Ba mu so" ("We do not want him"). But force prevailed, and people now respect the power, wealth and majesty of the man, who has a great deal of influence in the nation.

The military president, Ibrahim Babangida, is said to have become a Muslim only in the army. He married his wife in the Catholic Church in Asaba, but the two of them are now alhajis. Always suspected by the Muslims, he has had to make generous gestures to placate them, but has not managed to satisfy any constituency.

Muslim rulers generally go out of their way to show that what they do is Islamic, but few are impressed. Unlike other Muslim countries, in Nigeria where freedom of expression is so high, state Islam cannot prevent people from turning to Muslim organizations that do inspire them. In this situation Islamic jamâ`as of every tendency flourish, expressing, channeling or exploiting the real religious feelings of the people. ⁽⁴⁴⁾

Conclusion

Of the positions taken by Muslims elsewhere, as noted at the beginning of this paper, Nigerian Muslims have had to cope with non-Muslim rule in the colonial and independent periods. Many of them have invoked the principle of "necessity" to justify a temporary compromise. Others see a pluralistic society in which all have equal rights as the right thing for Nigeria, and do not look forward at all to an Islamic state. Many others, however, dream and work for the day when Nigeria will be ruled according to Sharî`a strictly and completely applied.

In the meantime Muslims are having to cope with the phenomenon of state Islam, and many are turning for community support to the more satisfying jamâ`as, sometimes the more traditional Àûfî brotherhoods with their greater sense for African feelings and needs, and sometimes more revolutionary and purist groups like the Maitatsine, Izala or Shî`ites.

We cannot predict the evolution of Nigerian Islam. We can expect no radical turnabouts in Muslim support for Sharî`a, at least as a symbol. At the same time local experience and the brutal imposition of Sharî`a on non-Muslims in the Sudan makes Christians opposed to any further extension of Sharî`a in Nigeria. Yet it must be admitted that Muslim understanding and interpretation of Sharî`a have definitely been modified by the experience of the 20th century secular world and Christian campaigns for human rights. One principle is certainly operative: Muslims will not work out their destiny alone and in isolation. In no place in the country can they avoid interaction with non-Muslims, for the most part Christians, and that in a society which is not regulated by Christian principles but by secular cultural and market forces. If they can live at peace with Christians, they may be able to consolidate their own community and develop ways of accommodating to the inevitable changes of the modern world.

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NOTES

1. Written for Consultation of the Christian Councils in West Africa on Christian-Muslim Relations, Monrovia, 25-28 November 1984, in partial proceedings edited by N. Idarous, pp. 71-76. Bulletin on Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa (Birmingham), 4:1 (1986), 1-21. and the French: Kenny, J. La Shari'a au Nigeria: Aperçu historique, Bulletin - L'Islam et les relations islamo-chretiennes en Afrique, 4:1 (1986), 1-22. Ch. 11 in E. Ikenga Metuh (ed.), The gods in retreat: Continuity and change in African religion (Enugu. Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1986), 245-256. In Association of Episcopal Conferences of Anglophone West Africa, Christianity and Islam in dialogue (Cape Coast, 1987), pp. 30-37 (followed by my "Sharî`a: Implications for the Church in West Africa", pp. 37-50. In C.S. Momoh (ed.), Religions & their doctrines, vol. 1 of Nigerian Studies in Religious Tolerance (Lagos: Centre for Black and African Arts and Civilization, & National Association for Religious Tolerance, 1989), 337-345. It was revised for "Sharî`a and Christianity in Nigeria: Islam and a 'secular' sate," Journal of Religion in Africa 26:4 (1966), 338-364.

2. The following material was prepared for a PROCMURA consultation in Monrovia, 1984, and later printed in BICMURA, 4:1 (Jan. 1986).

3. Y. Urvoy, Histoire de l'empire du Bornou (Paris, 1949), p. 54.

4. H.R. Palmer, Sudanese memoirs (Lagos, 1928), I, p. 18.

5. Ibid., p. 104.

6. Ibid., p. 104.

7. Cf. M. Hiskett, "An Islamic tradition of reform in the Western Sudan form the 16th to the 18th century", Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 25 (1962), pp. 577-596; A.D.H. Bivar & M. Hiskett, "The Arabic literature of Nigeria to 1804: a provisional account", B.S.O.A.S., 25 (1962), pp. 106-109.

8. "Conversion reconsidered: some historical aspects of religious conversion in Black Africa", Africa, 43 (1973), p. 73.

9. Cf. M. Last, "Some economic aspects of conversion in Hausaland", ch. 13 in N. Levtzion (ed.), Conversion to Islam (Holmes & Meier, 1979), p. 237.

10. Cf. A.D.H. Bivar, "The Wathîqat ahl al-Sudân, a manifesto to the Fulani jihad", Journal of African History, 3 (1961), pp. 235-243.

11. Cf. F.H. El-Masri, A critical edition of Dan Fodio's Bayân wujûb al-hijra `alâ l-`ibâd, with introduction, English translation and commentary, University of Ibadan Ph.D. thesis, 1968.

12. On the Sokoto empire in the 19th century see M. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate (London, 1967) and R.A. Adeleye, Power and diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804-1906 (London, 1971).

13. On the use of this term, cf. Murray Last, The Sokoto Caliphate (London: Longmans, 1967).

14. For an account of the conquest and the arrangements the British made with the local authorities see Lady Lugard, A tropical dependency (London, 1906); H.F. Backwell, The occupation of Hausaland 1900-1904 (London, 1927); & D.J. Muffett, Concerning brave captains (London, 1964).

15. Political memoranda (London, 1906), p. 84.

16. Cf. J.N.D. Anderson, Islamic law in Africa (London, 1955), p. 173.

17. Ibid., p. 11.

18. See the analysis of J.N. Anderson, ibid., pp. 184-219.

19. Cf. J.N.D. Anderson, "Conflict of laws in Northern Nigeria", Journal of African Law, 1 (1957), pp. 82-83.

20. Cf. J.N.D. Anderson, "Law and custom in Muslim areas in Africa, recent developments in Nigeria", Civilizations, 7 (1957), p. 28.

21. Cf. J.N.D. Anderson, Islamic law in Nigeria, p. 219, and "Law and custom in Muslim areas in Africa", pp. 28-29.

22. J.N.D. Anderson, "Return visit to Nigeria: judicial and legal developments in the Northern Region", International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 12 (1963), p. 282.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., pp. 285 & 289.

25. Reports of the Constitution Drafting Committee (Lagos, 1976), vol. 2, p. 103.

26. E. Ochinokwu, Daily Times, 19 April 1977.

27. New Nigerian, 29 March 1977.

28. New Nigerian, 15 September 1977.

29. New Nigerian, 1 August 1977.

30. Cf. New Nigerian, 7 April, 15 & 22 August, 2, 3, 5, 6 & 30 August, 13 & 28 September 1977.

31. New Nigerian, 12 April 1977.

32. New Nigerian, 30 August 1977.

33. Cf. for example Muktari S. Abdul-Qadir, Daily Times, 22 March 1977, and S. No'ibi, "The Nigerian Draft Constitution and the Shari`ah controversy", N.A.T.A.I.S., 1 (December 1977), pp. 88-121.

34. The 1979 Constitution, n. 242.

35. Loc. cit.

36. These points are stressed by René Luc Moreau, Africains musulmans (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1982), especially p. 211 ff. See also Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, "Islam and power in Black Africa", in Cudsi & Dessouki, pp. 158-166.

37. Cf. Bisi T. Elegbede, The Muslim aladura, B.A. long essay, Department of Religious Studies, University of Ibadan, 1991.

38. Cf. Y.A. Quadri, "Qâdiriyyah and Tijâniyyah relations in Nigeria in the 20th century", Orita, 16:1 (January, 1984), pp. 15 ff.

39. Cf. John N. Paden, Religion and political culture in Kano (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), chs. 2 & 3.

40. Cf. Y.A. Quadri, "A study of the Izala, a contemporary anti-Sufi organisation in Nigeria", Orita, 17:2 (December 1985), pp. 32 ff.

41. Besides the Nigerian daily newspapers and magazines, see Allan Christelow, "The 'Yan Tatsine disturbances in Kano - search for perspective", Muslim World, 75 (1985), pp. 69-84; and chapter 6 of Yusufu Bala Usman, The manipulation of religion in Nigeria, 1977-1987 (Kaduna: Vanguard, 1987).

42. See paper II.

43. For a detailed account of the conflict between government and traditional authorities, see John Paden, Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto (Zaria: Hudahuda, 1986).

44. On the reasons for the continuing attraction of Islam for the people see J. Kenny, "L'Eglise et l'Islam en Afrique de l'Ouest au XXe siècle (avec une référence particulière au Nigeria)" in G. Ruggieri, Eglise et histoire de l'Eglise en Afrique. Actes du colloque de Bologne 22-25 Octobre 1988 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1989).