Document 1
A MEDIEVAL THEOLOGICAL/LEGAL VIEW
THE STATUS OF UNBELIEF
by Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274)
Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 10
Third Article: Whether unbelief is the greatest of sins
Fourth article: Whether every act of an unbeliever is a sin
Seventh article: Whether one ought to dispute with unbelievers in public
Eighth article: Whether unbelievers ought to be compelled to the faith
Tenth article: Whether unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful
Eleventh article: Whether the rites of unbelievers ought to be tolerated
Twelfth article: Whether the children of Jews and of other unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents= will
Third Article: Whether unbelief is the greatest of sins
I answer that every sin consists formally in aversion from God. Hence the more a sin severs man from God, the graver it is. now man is more than ever separated from God by unbelief, because he has not even true knowledge of God: and by false knowledge of God, man does not approach Him, but is severed from Him.
Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of God to know Him in any way at all, because the object of his opinion is not God. Therefore it is clear that the sin of unbelief is greater than any sin that occurs in the perversion of morals...
[Q. 34, a. 2, ad 2: Yet unbelief is not sinful unless it be voluntary: wherefore the more voluntary it is, the more it is sinful. Now it becomes voluntary by the fact that a man hates the truth that is proposed to him. Wherefore it is evident that unbelief derives its sinfulness from hatred of God, whose truth is the object of faith; and hence just as a cause is greater than its effect, so hatred of God is a greater sin than unbelief.]
Fourth article: Whether every act of an unbeliever is a sin.
Mortal sin takes away sanctifying grace, but does not wholly corrupt the good of nature. Since therefore, unbelief is a mortal sin, unbelievers are without grace, yet some good of nature remains in them. Consequently it is evident that unbelievers cannot do those good works which proceed from grace, viz. meritorious works; yet they can, to a certain extent, do those good works for which the good of nature suffices.
Hence it does not follow that they sin in everything they do; but whenever they do anything out of their unbelief, then they sin. For even as one who has the faith can commit an actual sin, venial or even mortal, which he does not refer to the end of faith, so too, an unbeliever can do a good deed in a matter which he does not refer to the end of his unbelief.
Seventh article: Whether one ought to dispute with unbelievers in public
In disputing about the faith, two things must be observed; one on the part of the disputant, the other on the part of his hearers. On the part of the disputant, we must consider his intention. For if he were to dispute as though he had doubts about the faith, and did not hold the truth of faith for certain, and as though he intended to probe it with arguments, without doubt he would sin, as being doubtful of the faith and an unbeliever. On the other hand, it is praiseworthy to dispute about the faith in order to confute errors, or for practice.
On the part of the hearers we must consider whether those who hear the disputation are instructed and firm in the faith, or simple and wavering. As to those who are well instructed and firm in the faith, there can be no danger in disputing about the faith in their presence. But as to simple-minded people, we must make a distinction; because either they are provoked and molested by unbelievers, for instance Jews or heretics or pagans who strive to corrupt the faith in them, or else they are not subject to provocation in this matter, as in those countries where there are no unbelievers.
In the first case it is necessary to dispute in public about the faith, provided there be those who are equal and adapted to the task of confuting errors, since in this way simple people are strengthened in the faith, and unbelievers are deprived of the opportunity to deceive, while if those who ought to withstand the perverters of the truth of faith were silent, this would tend to strengthen error. Hence Gregory says: AEven as a thoughtless speech gives rise to error, so does an indiscreet silence leave those in error who might have been instructed.=
On the other hand, in the second case it is dangerous to dispute in public about the faith in the presence of simple people, whose faith for this very reason is more firm that they have never heard anything differing from what they believe. Hence it is not expedient for them to hear what unbelievers have to say against the faith.
Eighth article: Whether unbelievers ought to be compelled to the faith
Among unbelievers there are some who have never received the faith, such as the heathens and the Jews: and these are by no means to be compelled to the faith, in order that they may believe, because to believe depends on the will: nevertheless they should be compelled by the faithful, if it be possible to do so, so that they do not hinder the faith by their blasphemies or by their evil persuasions, or even by their open persecutions. It is for this reason that Christ=s faithful often wage war with unbelievers, not indeed for the purpose of forcing them to believe, because even if they were to conquer them and take them prisoners, they should still leave them free to believe if they will, but in order to prevent them from hindering the faith of Christ.
On the other hand, there are unbelievers who at some time have accepted the faith and professed it, such as heretics and all apostates: such should be submitted even to bodily compulsion, that they may fulfil what they have promised , and hold what they at one time received.
Tenth article: Whether unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful
This question may be considered in two ways. First, we may speak of dominion or authority of unbelievers over the faithful as of a thing to be established for the first time. This ought by no means to be allowed, since it would provoke scandal and endanger the faith, for subjects are easily influenced by their superiors to comply with their commands, unless the subjects are of great virtue: moreover unbelievers hold the faith in contempt, if they see the faithful fall away. Hence the Apostle forbade the faithful to go to law before an unbelieving judge. And so the Church altogether forbids unbelievers to acquire dominion over believers, or to have authority over them in any capacity whatever.
Secondly, we may speak of dominion or authority as already in force: and here we must observe that dominion and authority are institutions of human law, while the distinction between faithful and unbelievers arises from the divine law. Now the divine law, which is the law of grace, does not do away with human law which is the law of natural reason. Wherefore the distinction between faithful and unbelievers, considered in itself, does not do away with dominion and authority of unbelievers over the faithful.
Nevertheless this right of dominion or authority can be justly done away with by the sentence or ordination of the Church who has the authority of God: since unbelievers in virtue of their unbelief deserve to forfeit their power over the faithful who are converted into children of God.
This the Church does sometimes, and sometimes not... Yet the Church has not applied this law to those unbelievers who are not subject to her or her members in temporal matters, although she has the right to do so: and this, in order to avoid scandal...
Eleventh article: Whether the rites of unbelievers ought to be tolerated
Human government is derived from the divine government, and should imitate it. Now, although God is all-powerful and supremely good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take place in the universe which He might prevent, lest without them greater goods might be forfeited or greater evils ensue. Accordingly, in human government also, those who are in authority rightly tolerate certain evils, lest certain goods be lost or certain greater evils be incurred: thus Augustine says: AIf you do away with harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust.@ Hence, though unbelievers sin in their rites, they may be tolerated, either on account of some good that ensues therefrom, or because of some evil avoided. Thus from the fact that the Jews observe their rites, which of old foreshadowed the truth of the faith which we hold, there follows this good─ that our very enemies bear witness to our faith, and that our faith is represented in a figure, so to speak. For this reason they are tolerated in the observance of their rites.
On the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which are neither truthful nor profitable are by no means to be tolerated, except perchance in order to avoid an evil, e.g. the scandal or disturbance that might ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation of those who, if they were unmolested, might gradually be converted to the faith. For this reason the Church at times has tolerated the rites even of heretics and pagans, when unbelievers were very numerous.
Twelfth article: Whether the children of Jews and of other unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents= will
The custom of the Church has very great authority and ought to be jealously observed n all things, since the very doctrine of Catholic doctors derives its authority from the Church. Hence we ought to abide by the authority of the Church rather than by that of an Augustine or a Jerome or of any doctor whatever. Now it was never the custom of the Church to baptize the children of Jews against the will of their parents, although at times past there have been many very powerful Catholic princes like Constantine and Theodosius, with whom most holy bishops were on most friendly terms, as Sylvester with Constantine, and Ambrose with Theodosius, who would certainly not have failed to obtain this favour from them if it had been at all reasonable. It seems therefore hazardous to repeat this assertion, that the children of Jews should be baptized against their parents= wishes, in contradiction to the Church=s custom observed hitherto.
There are two reasons for this custom. One is on account of the danger to faith. For children baptized before coming to the use of reason, afterwards when they come to perfect age might easily be persuaded by their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly embraced; and this would be detrimental to the faith.
The other reasons is that it is against natural justice. For a child is by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not distinct from its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its mother=s womb; and later on after birth and before it has the use of its free will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is like a spiritual womb; for so long as man has not the use of reason he differs not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a horse belongs to someone who, according to civil law, can use them when he likes as his own instrument, so according to natural law a son, before coming to the use of reason, is under his father=s care. Hence it would be contrary to natural justice if a child, before coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from its parents= custody, or anything done to it against its parents= wish. As soon, however, as it begins to have the use of its free will, it begins to belong to itself and is able to look after itself in matters concerning the divine or natural law, and then it should be induced, not by compulsion but by persuasion, to embrace the faith: it can then consent to the faith and be baptized, even against its parents= wish, but not before it comes to the use of reason. Hence it is said of the children of the fathers of old that they were saved in the faith of their parents; whereby we are given to understand that it is the parents= duty to look after the salvation of their children, especially before they come to the use of reason.